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A diverse workforce has long been associated with mul-
tiple firm benefits, but this is sometimes difficult to
achieve due to employer discrimination. Although mul-
tiple institutional arrangements have been put in place
to ban discriminatory behavior, the effects of such reg-
ulations remain relatively unexplored, often neglecting
start-ups. We propose that institutional changes aiming
to outlaw employment discrimination will trigger two
main effects: they will (a) depress start-up founding
rates through enhancement of wage-work appeal, and
(b) increase the average start-up quality due to a higher
threshold for leaving wage-work. We test our predic-
tions by exploiting the staggered enactment of Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Acts in the U.S. Consistent
with our theory, we find that this institutional protec-
tion reduced the quantity of entrepreneurship but
increased its quality.
Managerial Summary: Do laws that protect tradition-
ally oppressed groups from discrimination in the work-
place affect the propensity of workers to leave their
company and start an entrepreneurial venture? Our
study shows that legislative changes that ban the dis-
crimination against members of the LGBT community
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in the labor market have a two-fold effect on entrepre-
neurship. First, they reduce the workers' propensity to
start a new venture (thus reducing the loss of human
capital) because of an increased relative appeal of the
workplace. Second, they increase the overall quality of
the startups founded in the region, increasing the over-
all welfare. Additionally, we find that these effects are
more likely to be present when litigation against
employment discrimination is more frequent and when
the protected minorities are more prevalent.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Transition into entrepreneurship is a common occupational experience, with many individuals
starting and running their own business at some point in their life. Accordingly, scholars in
strategy and entrepreneurship continue to debate when individuals choose to become founders
(e.g., Campbell, Agarwal, & Seth, 2012; Kacperczyk, 2012). In addressing this question, ample
research has recognized the critical importance of the institutional environment—in terms of
regulatory changes and policies—in facilitating or hindering entrepreneurship across regions
and nations (Armour & Cumming, 2008; Castellaneta, Conti, & Kacperczyk, 2020; Conti &
Valentini, 2018; Eberhart, Eesley, & Eisenhardt, 2017; Eesley, 2016; Hiatt, Sine, &
Tolbert, 2009; Sine & David, 2010). Yet despite this extant work, our understanding of how the
institutional environment impacts entrepreneurship, influencing its quantity and quality,
remains sorely incomplete.
For the most part, researchers have focused on the impact of institutions targeting prospec-
tive founders. For example, scholars have evaluated the impact of regulations designed to facili-
tate entrepreneurship, by removing barriers to key resources on which entrepreneurial entry
depends (e.g., Eberhart et al., 2017; Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert, 2005). Before
they access resources, however, individuals must first decide whether to forgo paid employment
and become founders. Indeed, recent advances in entrepreneurship theory indicate that entre-
preneurial entry is intertwined with individual mobility dynamics because employees evaluate
the decision to launch a new venture against the backdrop of conditions they face in paid
employment (e.g., Kacperczyk, 2012; Kacperczyk & Marx, 2016; Sørensen & Sharkey, 2014;
Stenard & Sauermann, 2016). Thus, institutions targeting employees and affecting employment
conditions may dramatically change an individual's propensity to become a founder and, hence,
they need to be considered more fully.
In this study, we thus shift the focus from regulations that target founders and aim to
improve their access to resources, to regulations that target employees, and aim to improve their
conditions in wage work. Drawing on ample research documenting the key role of institutional
protection against employment discrimination in increasing the appeal of the workplace
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(Dobbin & Kelly, 2007; Dobbin, Sutton, Meyer, & Scott, 1993; Kalev & Dobbin, 2006; Kelly &
Dobbin, 1998), we develop a simple theoretical framework that relates regulatory changes that
prohibit employment discrimination to entrepreneurship. We propose that, as the regulatory
environment becomes hostile to employment discrimination, this will impact entrepreneurship
in two ways: (a) it will depress the founding rates through enhancement of the relative appeal
of wage work, and (b) it will increase the average new-venture quality and survival due to a
higher threshold for leaving wage work. We further expect that these effects will operate both
directly, by reducing departures to entrepreneurship among the protected class members
(i.e., individuals targeted by antidiscrimination laws), and indirectly, by reducing departures for
entrepreneurship among nonprotected minority groups, as well as nonminority employees,
more generally. Overall, we expect that institutional protection targeting disadvantaged
workers—as opposed to protection targeting founders—will have an unexpected, so-far over-
looked impact on startup creation and quality.
To test our theoretical predictions, we focus on the enactment of Employment Non-
Discrimination Acts (ENDA) in U.S. This legislation has several notable advantages for our
study. First, it aimed to prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity, thus matching the importance of earlier acts against employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability (Dobbin et al., 1993;
Kelly & Dobbin, 1998, 1999). Second, its enactment represents a plausibly exogenous shock
with respect to entrepreneurship, offering a fortuitous opportunity for causal identification.
Finally, the legislation has been progressively introduced in 15 U.S. states over the period of
1980–2006, allowing for the use of a staggered difference-in-differences approach. We find sup-
port for our claims that institutional change aiming to ban employment discrimination affects
entrepreneurial entry: it depresses entry rates, on the one hand, but increases quality of new
ventures, on the other hand. In summary, our results support the notion that institutions that
target employees—by protecting them against employer discrimination—represent an over-
looked factor driving the rate and quality of entrepreneurship. Our results are further robust to
a battery of robustness tests. At the same time, we provide strong empirical evidence consistent
with the underlying mechanisms we theorize. Finally, supplemental analyses refute alternative
explanations for our main findings, such as an increase in start-up costs due to the new laws,
contemporary institutional changes, and others.
2 | THEORY
2.1 | Past research
What motivates individuals to launch new ventures and become founders is the subject of long-
standing inquiry in entrepreneurship and strategy literature (e.g., Kacperczyk, 2012;
Kacperczyk & Marx, 2016; Stenard & Sauermann, 2016). Whereas the vast majority of studies
have documented the role of individual and organizational factors, researchers have increas-
ingly linked entrepreneurial entry with the characteristics of the institutional environment and
the critical role of changes in institutions, deemed to regulate entry (e.g., Eesley, 2016; Sine &
David, 2010; Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005). For example, differences in regulatory reforms
have been found to account for variation in entrepreneurship rates across regions and countries
(Armour & Cumming, 2008). In addition, institutional changes exert an important influence on
the individuals' motivation and ability to transition into entrepreneurship, by enhancing their
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willingness to strike out on their own (e.g., Eberhart et al., 2017; Eesley, 2016). However,
despite rich research inquiry into changes in regulatory institutions, our understanding of their
effect on entrepreneurship remains incomplete. In examining the impact of the institutional
environment, the lion's share of attention has focused on institutions that target prospective
founders—by facilitating access to critical resources needed to launch new ventures. For exam-
ple, the preponderance of research has considered institutional changes designed to reduce the
barriers to entrepreneurship in terms of financial or human capital, and thus to increase
founding rates (e.g., Castellaneta et al., 2020; Eberhart et al., 2017; Eesley, 2016).
Yet transition into entrepreneurship is not solely a function of access to resources. Prospec-
tive founders also need to decide whether to leave wage work for entrepreneurship in the first
place. Indeed, entry into entrepreneurship can be characterized as a career-mobility process,
given that the majority of entrepreneurs proceed from paid employment (e.g., Audia &
Rider, 2005; Sørensen & Fassiotto, 2011). From this perspective, the decision to become a foun-
der is not a function of access to resources alone; rather, it also depends on the appeal of work-
place conditions or the attractiveness of wage work, in general (Kacperczyk, 2012; Sørensen &
Sharkey, 2014). Empirically, studies find that individuals exhibit greater tendency to strike out
on their own when options in wage employment are blocked or unattractive, making entrepre-
neurship more appealing in relative terms (e.g., Hellmann, 2007; Kacperczyk, 2012;
Kacperczyk & Marx, 2016). For example, workers have been found to favor entrepreneurship
over paid employment when launching a startup is more lucrative (Amit & Muller, 1995), when
promotion chances available in wage work are less abundant or less accessible (Kacperczyk &
Marx, 2016; Sørensen & Sharkey, 2014), or when accommodating employees' own initiatives in
wage work becomes difficult or unlikely (Hellmann, 2007; Klepper, 2007; Shah, Agarwal, &
Echambadi, 2019). In all these instances, the opportunity cost of leaving paid employment is
sufficiently low to entice the pursuit of entrepreneurship in lieu of being a wage worker.
Together, these studies underscore the profound impact of career options available in the work-
place, and the cost of giving them up, in shaping the propensity of becoming a founder.
If workplace conditions affect entrepreneurial mobility decisions, then institutional changes
that target current employees and affect workers' career choices may also significantly influence
entrepreneurial rates. Indeed, ample research in sociology and strategy indicates that institu-
tional employment protection—especially including regulation that prohibits employer discrim-
ination against minority workers—is not only prevalent, but also consequential. Although an
inclusive, diverse workplace has long been documented to enhance a firm's performance and
sustainable competitive advantage, diverse work environments are difficult to foster and main-
tain because employers may indulge their “taste for discrimination,” by limiting opportunities
of certain groups due to conscious and unconscious bias against minorities (Becker, 1957, 1971;
Borjas & Ramey, 1995). Importantly, given the significant societal and firm-related costs that
arise because of discrimination, multiple institutional protections have been put in place to
counter discrimination in how employers hire, promote, and fire workers (e.g., Kelly &
Dobbin, 1998). For example, in the United States alone, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of
1964, antidiscrimination law has been progressively developed to outlaw employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of societally disadvantaged traits such as race, color, creed, or national ori-
gin. Indeed, these regulative changes—which aim to prohibit employment discrimination and
increase workplace diversity—have been commonly considered the primary means by which
individuals are protected from disadvantageous treatment in wage work (Rubin, 2019).
Despite its prevalence, past studies have not examined how institutional protection of
minority workers affects entrepreneurship. A small number of studies have considered the
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impact of discrimination—and of the practices designed to counter negative bias on the basis of
race or gender—on entrepreneurial rates (e.g., Fairlie & Robb, 2007; Younkin &
Kuppuswamy, 2017) and the subsequent growth of entrepreneurial firms (e.g., Blanchflower,
Levine, & Zimmerman, 2003; Freeland & Keister, 2016; Kacperczyk, Younkin, & Rocha, 2021).
There is additional evidence that discrimination is a central hindrance to entrepreneurship
because stereotypes and negative biases can suppress access to key resources, such as capital,
on which the founding of a new venture depends (e.g., Buttner & Rosen, 1989). Despite its valu-
able insight, however, this work has been limited to discriminatory behaviors (and their influ-
ence) that arise on the part of resource holders in entrepreneurship, including investors,
suppliers, and banks (Carter & Shaw, 2006; Thébaud & Sharkey, 2016), as well as startup
employees (Kacperczyk et al., 2021). By contrast, institutional protection of minority workers
has been mostly neglected, leaving its potential impact on the rate of creation and quality of
startups unclear. With few notable exceptions (Hwang, 2021; Hwang & Phillips, 2020), the rela-
tionship between labor market discrimination and entrepreneurship has received little atten-
tion. Hence, the need to unpack the impact of institutional career constraints on
entrepreneurship provides a motivation for our study. In what follows, we therefore examine
how the legal compulsion not to discriminate and to ensure that members of traditionally-
oppressed groups are treated in the same way as other employees may alter the relative benefits
of leaving paid employment for entrepreneurship.
2.2 | The twofold effect of institutional protection against
employment discrimination on entrepreneurship
There is strong reason to expect that protection of historically-oppressed groups will affect
entrepreneurship in two ways: by (a) depressing the rates of new-venture creation, and
(b) enhancing the average quality of new ventures. Following Coleman's (1994) diagram, which
has become the standard way of representing micro–macro links, we stipulate that macro-level
shifts in institutional employment protection will result in macro-level changes in startup rates
and quality via the micro-level dynamics unfolding in firms and affecting employees
(cf., Figure 1). First, as institutional protection against employment discrimination increases,
this will lead to micro-level initiatives introduced by employers to comply with the law and pro-
tect certain minority workers from discrimination (macro-to-micro link 1). These initiatives
will, in turn, enhance the appeal of wage work relative to entrepreneurship, mainly among the
employees of the protected class, but also among other minority workers as well as for some of
their nonminority colleagues (micro-to-micro link 2). Finally, as the attractiveness of wage
FIGURE 1 Theoretical model
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work among these different groups increases, employees will become less inclined to leave for
entrepreneurship but more prone to found high-quality ventures, leading to lower founding
rates but higher startup quality at the macro level (micro-to-macro link 3). Figure 1 summarizes
the causal pathways we envision, which connect institutional protection and entrepreneurship.
2.2.1 | The effect of institutional protection against employment
discrimination on founding rates
We first turn to the impact of institutional protection against employment discrimination on
founding rates. There is a strong reasons to expect that, following regulative changes that extend
institutional protection to historically-discriminated groups, the protected class will likely become
shielded from employment discrimination and experience better overall treatment in wage work as
employers start complying with new regulations—either because conscious, negative actions sub-
side, or because discriminated groups can more easily seek redress for acts of discrimination
through lawsuits or grievance procedures, which are often costly for employers (Rubin, 2019). And
although evidence for the efficacy of diversity policies remains mixed and may critically depend on
the specific initiatives introduced (e.g., Kalev & Dobbin, 2006), institutions prohibiting employment
discrimination generally improve the status of newly-protected groups in terms of their earnings or
career advancement (e.g., Collins, 2003). Better access to previously-out-of-reach opportunities will,
in turn, enhance the attractiveness of wage work among newly protected groups and, by default,
reduce the relative appeal of entrepreneurship. Consistent with this claim, research shows that dis-
advantaged groups find employers with formal personnel systems in place to prevent discrimination
(Barbulescu & Bidwell, 2013) or those perceived as less discriminatory at the point of hire or post-
hire (e.g., Pager & Pedulla, 2015) more appealing. Along similar lines, formerly incarcerated individ-
uals are more likely to turn to entrepreneurship to avoid labor-market discrimination (Hwang &
Phillips, 2020), while scientists facing early-career immigration constraints, which prevent them
from integrating into the labor market, increase the likelihood of later career transitions of such
immigrants to the founding of incorporated ventures (Agarwal, Ganco, & Raffie, 2021). Finally,
anecdotal evidence suggests that minority groups place greater weight on launching and operating
their own venture than on wage work, preferring the former to the latter when they experience dis-
crimination in the labor market. For example, LGBT workers exhibit a stronger preference for self-
employment when discrimination based on sexual orientation becomes more prevalent in wage
work. As one LGBT freelancer stated: “if you freelance…your exposure to discriminatory colleagues
might be minimal” (Jacobs, 2016). Similarly, following the removal of LGBT protection in Kansas,
one LGBT entrepreneur commented: “I am glad to be self-employed.”1 Together, these examples
highlight that entrepreneurship will become a less attractive option relative to wage work when the
institutional protection against employment discrimination intensifies. Members of newly protected
groups who would otherwise be more inclined to become founders, will thus been more likely to
keep their attachment to wage work, leading to a decline of founding rates.
Second, as the institutional protection of certain groups from employment discrimination
increases and the working environment becomes more inclusive, significant spillovers to other
minority groups not included in the protected class may follow, diminishing the relative attrac-
tiveness of entrepreneurship among a wider group of traditionally-disadvantaged workers.
Other disadvantaged individuals, beyond the newly-protected class alone, will witness
1https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/l_anon/kansas-governor-removes-protections-for-lgbt-worke-t4562353.html.
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significant improvements in their own standing. For example, employers may extend protection
to a broader circle of disadvantaged workers, given that these individuals share the common
experience of being discriminated against (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hutchinson, 1997;
Urban & Miller, 1998; Wildman, 1996), and thus can be classified as belonging to the “minor-
ity” category (Zhu, Shen, & Hillman, 2014).2 In addition, increases in the institutional protec-
tion of historically oppressed groups will signal to other disadvantaged workers that the
employer is committed to treating all employees equitably (Griffith & Hebl, 2002; Ragins &
Cornwell, 2001). Together, these different mechanisms indicate that protecting certain disad-
vantaged groups from employment discrimination will enhance the perception of wage work
among the protected class as well as among other members of disadvantaged groups,
diminishing the relative appeal of entrepreneurship as an occupational choice.
Finally, institutional protection from employment discrimination may also enhance the per-
ception of wage work among nondisadvantaged workers, leading to further spillover effects. Fol-
lowing institutional changes that aim to ban discrimination of disadvantaged groups in paid
employment, even nondisadvantaged individuals may find wage work marginally more attractive
and will thus be less willing to leave for entrepreneurship. As Li and Nagar (2013) put it, “an orga-
nization's policies toward its employees, whether an inclusive healthcare policy or discriminatory
promotion or hiring policy send latent signals to the entire organization (…). Such signals might
then impact all employees” (p. 543). And even if some employees may oppose antidiscrimination
policies, workers will, on average, consider equitable treatment of groups burdened by negative
stereotypes a desirable societal goal. Indeed, the act of extending protections to historically
oppressed groups, similar to other corporate social responsibility initiatives (Burbano, Mamer, &
Snyder, 2013; Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2016; Greening & Turban, 2000; Kacperczyk, 2009), is often
associated with higher levels of workplace engagement and employee job satisfaction
(Dimarco, 1975; Downey, van der Werff, Thomas, & Plaut, 2015; Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2019;
Greening & Turban, 2000) and lower employee turnover (Bode, Singh, & Rogan, 2015; Flammer &
Kacperczyk, 2019). Hence, following this accumulated research, we expect that, in the aftermath
of the enactment of institutions protecting minority groups from employment discrimination, the
reputation of the employer as equitable and fair will increase, resulting in greater job satisfaction
and lower propensity to leave for entrepreneurship among nonminorities.
Overall, we anticipate that regulative changes that ban employment discrimination will
reduce the rates of entrepreneurship because of the direct impact on workers belonging to the
protected class, and the indirect impact on other minorities, as well as at least some
nonminority workers.
Hypothesis (H1). Increases in institutional protection from employment discrimina-
tion will lead to a decline in the rates of entrepreneurial foundings.
2.2.2 | The effect of institutional protection against employment
discrimination on new-venture quality
Our previous arguments suggest that institutional protection from employment discrimination will
suppress the rates of entrepreneurial entry by increasing the relative appeal of wage work vis-à-vis
2Research shows that different types of discrimination, including racism and sexism, tend to all be perceived as
instances of generalized discrimination (Hutchinson, 1997; Wildman, 1996).
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entrepreneurship. A direct corollary of our argument is that the opportunity cost of leaving wage
work for entrepreneurship will increase, as disadvantaged groups gain institutional protection and
discriminatory practices in the labor market become outlawed. From a worker's perspective, this
will increase the threshold to give up paid employment, encouraging employees to incur the cost
of leaving only when expected payoffs from new ventures appear more promising. Indeed, numer-
ous studies report that startups exhibit a higher growth potential and stronger survival chances
when entry threshold increases, and new ventures are thus unlikely to reflect a necessity or lack of
satisfying employment options (Fairlie and Fossen, 2017). For example, women become more
inclined to pursue high-growth ventures when family-friendly amenities, which women often
value, tend to be more easily accessible in paid employment, making any potential move to entre-
preneurship more costly (Thébaud, 2015). Similarly, enforcement on noncompete covenants,
which increases the hiring cost for founders and thus reduces the relative appeal of entrepreneur-
ship vis-à-vis paid work, has been found to result in the creation of higher-growth, longer-
surviving ventures (Starr, Balasubramanian, & Sakakibara, 2018). Taken together, these studies
imply that workers will make career detours to entrepreneurship primarily in cases when new-
venture opportunities are more promising or more valuable than staying put in paid employment.
Importantly, extending this logic to protection against employment discrimination, it follows that
the average quality of new ventures will increase, when institutional protection of minority
workers intensifies. Hence, we predict that:
Hypothesis (H2). Increases in institutional protection from employment discrimina-
tion will lead to an increase in startup quality.
2.2.3 | Institutional protection against employment discrimination and
entrepreneurship: mechanisms
Our model posits that institutional protection against discrimination results in lower employ-
ment discrimination of certain protected groups via the enactment of corporate ant-
idiscrimination policies. To avoid being sued, employers will be more likely to enact these
policies in environments where the protected minorities are more prevalent and, hence, the
chances of legal recourse due to employer discrimination is higher (which reinforces link 1 in
Figure 1). In addition, following a reduction in employer discrimination, increases in employee
job satisfaction will be higher in these environments (cf., link 2 in Figure 1), given that the
protected employees are especially sensitive to firm policies that promote inclusion. Consistent
with this claim, past studies find that the presence of supportive LGBT policies within an orga-
nization is associated with gay and lesbian employees' greater job satisfaction (Day &
Schoenrade, 2000; Griffith & Hebl, 2002) and fewer discrimination reports by LGBT employees
(e.g., Ragins & Cornwell, 2001). It follows, therefore, that minority groups that gain institutional
protection from employers' discriminatory acts will be more likely to favor wage work over
entrepreneurship. Accordingly, we expect the decline in entrepreneurial foundings and the
increase in the share of high-quality ventures to be amplified when the protected groups are
more prevalent. Hence,
Hypothesis (H3a). Following increases in institutional protection from employment
discrimination, decreases in startup foundings will be amplified when the protected
minorities are more prevalent.
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Hypothesis (H3b). Following increases in institutional protection from employment
discrimination, increases in startup quality will be amplified when the protected
minorities are more prevalent.
A further implication of our model is the claim that increases in institutional protection
against discrimination will be more consequential for employers when the protected groups
exhibit a higher tendency to mobilize regulatory institutions—via legal complaints and
grievances—to enforce their rights and benefits. Importantly, when those most subject to
employer discrimination can more easily make use of institutional protections by seeking
redress for discriminatory acts, employers will respond by complying to a larger degree with the
regulatory changes in order to avoid financial or reputational costs of litigation. For example,
studying a number of high-profile sex and race discrimination lawsuits settled against publicly
traded companies in the United States, Hirsh and Cha (2018) found that legal pressures pro-
duced significant diversity gains by increasing the representation of women and nonwhites in
managerial ranks. More generally, lawsuits against employers will have an equity-enhancing
effect, generating policy changes that improve minority conditions and reduce the prevalence of
discriminatory acts in wage work. Hence, when minorities exhibit a greater tendency to mobi-
lize institutions in an effort to fend off discrimination in paid employment, institutional protec-
tion will be particularly effective in reducing discrimination in the workplace (which
strengthens link 1 in Figure 1), and increasing employee job satisfaction (consistent with link
2 in Figure 1). It follows, therefore, that the macro effects we predict—the decline in the
founding rates of new businesses and the concurrent increase in their quality—will be addition-
ally amplified when litigation against employment discrimination is more prevalent. Hence:
Hypothesis (H4a). Following increases in institutional protection from employment
discrimination, decreases in startup foundings will be amplified when litigation
against employment discrimination is more prevalent.
Hypothesis (H4b). Following increases in institutional protection from employment
discrimination, increases in startup quality will be amplified when litigation against
employment discrimination is more prevalent.
3 | EMPIRICAL SETTING AND DATA
To examine the impact of employment antidiscrimination institutions on entrepreneurship, we
exploit the passage of legislation that reduced employers' discriminatory acts, taking advantage
of the staggered enactment of such laws in different moments in time across different
U.S. states. Specifically, we consider state-level enactment of the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), which shields workers from employment discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The District of Columbia was first to pass such
law in 1977, and by the end of 2011, 21 states had followed suit (see Table A1). These enact-
ments are suitable for our identification strategy for at least three reasons. First, substantial
empirical evidence shows that discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity
has been an important challenge in the workplace (e.g., Badgett, Lau, Sears, & Ho, 2007). The
United States still has no federal legislation in place to prohibit discrimination in the labor mar-
ket based on sexual orientation. Yet, driven by individual actions and pressure from social
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movements, a number of states have enacted laws prohibiting employment discrimination. The
protections they provide mirror earlier protections against discrimination based on race, gender,
religion, national origin, and physical disability, and they have allowed advocates to frame sex-
ual orientation protections as incremental additions to existing policies (Klawitter &
Flatt, 1998). Second, despite being possibly driven by social movements, the enactment of ant-
idiscrimination legislation is unlikely to be related to any economic characteristics of the state,
including the rate or quality of entrepreneurship. Accounts of the political economy of these
reforms suggest their passage is exogenous to product markets, innovation, and entrepreneurial
activities, and depends instead on other variables unrelated to the economy (Gao &
Zhang, 2017; Haider-Markel & Meier, 2003), an assumption which we empirically validate in
our setting, by assessing whether the trend in the outcome variables differs between treated and
control states—cf., Table 2—and whether the past levels of the outcome variables predict the
enactment of the antidiscrimination legislation—cf., Table A2.
Furthermore, it is largely accepted that ENDA's enactment reduces employment discrimina-
tion (Barron & Hebl, 2013; Klawitter & Flatt, 1998). Scholars have shown that ENDA has both
instrumental and symbolic effects. Instrumentally, biased employers discriminate less in hiring
and rewarding workers because ENDA creates an “expected cost,” which incorporates violating
the law if caught (e.g., attorney's fees, fines) multiplied by the probability of being caught
(Landes, 1968). Perceived risk of litigation and financial loss, as well as negative publicity and
harm to firm reputation, are key factors responsible for the impact of antidiscrimination legisla-
tion on firm behavior (Leonard, 1984). The symbolic effect suggests that, even absent the possi-
bility of tangible punishment, ENDA reduces discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
simply by designating such discrimination as illegal, criminal, or deviant (e.g., Tapp &
Kohlberg, 1971; Zimring and Hawkins, 2010). Indeed, the mere fact that this discrimination
becomes prohibited (without the threat of enforcement) is sufficient to create the symbolic
effect in changing workplace norms about the acceptability of prejudice and discrimination
toward gays and lesbians (Hebl et al., 2016). Accordingly, this antidiscrimination law has been
linked to employee perceptions of reduced discrimination (Griffith & Hebl, 2002; Ragins &
Cornwell, 2001), while others have documented the positive effects of ENDA on innovation
(Gao & Zhang, 2017) and firm performance (Nguyen, Kecskés, & Mansi, 2020).
4 | STATISTICAL APPROACH
To examine the impact of employment antidiscrimination legislation on entrepreneurship, we
use a difference-in-differences methodology based on the 15 “treatments” occurring between
1980 and 2006 (cf., Table A1). Our unit of analysis is the state-year. Our methodology follows
Bertrand and Mullainathan's (2003) application of the difference-in-differences methodology in
the presence of staggered treatments at the state level. Specifically, our main specifications will
take the following form:
Y st= f φs+τt+βADADst+βCVCVst−1ð Þ ð1Þ
where AD is the antidiscrimination law “treatment dummy”—equal to 1 if the state has
enacted the antidiscrimination law by year t—and φs and τt are state and year fixed effects
to control for, respectively, constant differences across U.S. states and aggregate changes
over time due to business cycles, national policies, and so forth. CV is a parsimonious
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vector of control variables coherent with previous literature (e.g., Conti &
Valentini, 2018), which includes real GDP per capita (source: Census Bureau), the net job
creation rate, or the job employment growth rate (source: LBD), state taxation level
(Census Bureau), the prevalence of minorities in the population, as measured by the pro-
portion of black people and women (source: Census Bureau), and the state population
education level, as proxied by the proportion of people with at least a college degree
(source: Census Bureau). Besides controlling for the economic and social factors tradition-
ally correlated with workers' opportunities, we also control for state political trends
because the political orientation of a state may plausibly influence both the adoption of
antidiscrimination legislation and entrepreneurship, leading to spurious correlations.
Hence, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the state had a Republi-
can Governor and “0” otherwise. Errors are clustered at the state level, to address serial
correlation concerns (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004).
The coefficient of interest is βAD, which measures the effect of antidiscrimination law on
our dependent variable. To verify our theoretical predictions, we consider different dependent
variables Y in Equation (1), related to the rate and quality of entrepreneurial ventures. First, we
assess the effect of antidiscrimination laws on the number of entrepreneurial foundings, using
data from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD provides data on annual
employments for every U.S. private sector establishment with a payroll. The underlying data
are sourced from U.S. tax records and Census Bureau surveys and span the period between
1977 and 2011. The LBD includes complete accounting even of small firms and establishments
often excluded or subsampled in typical corporate surveys. The LBD also lists physical locations
of establishments rather than states of incorporation. Following Kerr and Nanda (2009), for
each establishment we define its year of entry as the first year of positive employment.3 Our
main dependent variable—entrepreneurial foundings—is measured as the total number of
new, stand-alone establishments in a given U.S. state and year. Based on Hypothesis (H1), we
expect βAD to be negative. In addition, we expect the coefficient of antidiscrimination law to be
even more negative in states where LBGT minorities are more present (based on H3a), and
where discrimination is higher (based on H3b).
We further estimate the effect of the antidiscrimination law on startup quality. First, we
measure startup quality as the propensity of young firms to file for patents, proxied by the num-
ber of patent applications filed by new assignees in a given state-year normalized by the number
of new entrants.4 New firms that file for patents are more likely (a) to be endowed with superior
technologies and (b) to capture the value their technologies create. Several studies highlight the
impact of patenting on the survival of new ventures. Cockburn and Wagner (2007), for example,
found that for companies listed in the Nasdaq, having a patent portfolio increased their survival
after the dotcom bubble burst in the late 1990s. Helmers and Rogers (2010) similarly show that
for the 162,000 limited-liability companies created in the United Kingdom in 2001, patent and
3Prior research indicates that any potential lag between founding and hiring the first employee is often negligible
(i.e., under 1 year) (Dahl and Klepper, 2015; Fairlie and Miranda, 2016), making our measure a suitable proxy for
founding a new venture.
4Since we are interested in identifying inventions generated by individuals and used by the same individuals to found a
new venture, we assigned patents to states based on both the location of the (new) assignee and the location of the first
inventor. Hence, we exclude from our sample patents for which the two locations do not coincide, as these are likely to
be instances where individual inventors collaborate with or sell ideas to a company, rather than founding a new
business. Using alternative approaches (e.g., considering the location of the assignee or the location of the inventor)
produces similar findings (available upon request).
CONTI ET AL. 11------------t.=b93-WILEY~I -
trademark portfolios increased their survival rate after 5 years. In both cases, less than half the
companies owned patents; companies that owned patents had a significantly higher survival
rate (34% in the first study, 16% in the second). These and other studies provide compelling evi-
dence that new ventures are of higher quality when their propensity to patent increases. Data
on patents were retrieved from the USPTO Patentsview dataset.
Second, we proxy for quality of new ventures in a given state using the average amount of ven-
ture capital (VC) funding a new venture received, computed as the total amount of VC invest-
ments in a given state-year (available from 1980), normalized by the number of new entrants in
the same state-year. VC investments are an important milestone for a high-growth venture
(Guzman & Stern, 2016) and VC funding is associated with strong treatment and selection effects,
whereby venture capitalists spur higher growth of new ventures, while investing in ex-ante promis-
ing startups (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2011). Hence, if startups receive more funds from such
specialized investors, their growth potential and quality tends to be higher. The VC data
(by location of investee company) were retrieved from Thomson Reuters' VentureXpert.
Finally, we measure startup quality as proxied by their survival chances as the propor-
tion of startups created in a given state-year that were able to survive for at least 5 years
(Kerr & Nanda, 2009). Because our LBD ends in 2011, for firms founded in 2006, only a
5-year survival can be measured. Overall, due to data limitations, we can consider and mea-
sure all our dependent variables between 1980 and 2006—and this is the time frame for
which we estimate our models. Based on Hypothesis (H2), we expect βAD to be positive for
all our measures of new-venture quality and survival. Further, we expect the coefficient of
antidiscrimination law to be even more positive in states where LBGT minorities are more
present (based on Hypothesis (H3b)), and where discrimination levels are higher (based on
Hypothesis (H4b)). Table 1 reports summary statistics for our main state-level variables,
whereas Table A2 reports pairwise correlations for state-level variables.5
5 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 | Validity of the identification strategy
We begin by assessing the validity of our identification strategy, providing at the same time
some initial results. First, a difference-in-differences approach relies on the parallel trend
assumption, which states that the average change in outcome for the treated in the absence of
treatment should equal the average change in outcome for the nontreated. To verify that there
5As can be seen in Table 1, the majority of key state-level covariates that pertain to economic and social conditions
(e.g., GDP per capita, proportion of women, proportion of black people, and proportion of people with a college degree)
are similar across control and treated states, before the treatment. Although we find some covariates to be different
(e.g., the rate of job creation), this is fairly common. For example, in their seminal study, Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) similarly find differences between “eventually-treated” and “never-treated” states (e.g., with the
former having have larger plants in terms of headcount). Following their arguments, we consider such differences
immaterial for our identification strategy, for two reasons. First, because the enactment of the law is staggered over
time, most states that enact antidiscrimination law enter in both the “treated” and the “control” groups—mitigating the
concern that unobserved differences between the two groups may drive our results (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003).
Second, the identification assumptions of the difference-in-differences regression do not require that the treated and
control states exhibit similar levels in the covariates or outcome variables before the treatment. Rather, the difference-
in-differences approach relies on the similar trend in the outcome variable between the treated and control states: and,
as we will show, our data meet this assumption.
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were no divergent trends across states before the change in protection from employment
discrimination—and to assess how the ENDA's effect occurs over time—we construct a dynamic
difference-in-differences model, using a set of dummies that measure the distance in years from the
enactment of the law, before and after its introduction. The coefficients reported in Models 1–4 of
Table 2 indicate that there is no difference across states in the patterns of entry, quality, and survival
of ventures founded prior to the ENDA enactments, thus confirming that our results are not driven
by diverging pretreatment trends. By contrast, in the postchange period, the coefficients that relate
to the number of entrants (specification 1) become negative and are estimated with more precision.
Similarly, the coefficients for the effect of ENDA on all three measures of startup quality show a
meaningful effect only after the law enactment (see specifications 2–4, Table 2). Further, these esti-
mates lead to two important conclusions. First, the effect of antidiscrimination laws is immediate
for most outcomes, occurring at t + 1 or 1 year following the treatment. However, for VC funding,
the treatment effect is delayed until t + 3 or 3 years following the treatment. Such delay can be
explained by the fact that venture capitalists tend to heavily rely on key milestones (i.e., revenue),
which are not achieved until later in the startup life-cycle. Second, there is a negative pretrend in
the model considering the survival of startups, at t − 1 (Model 4)—which is likely to reduce the eco-
nomic significance of our results. Hence, when assessing the effect of the antidiscrimination laws
on the survival of startups, it is appropriate to control for state linear pretrend.
Figures 2–5 display dynamically the confidence interval of the parameter estimates of law
enactment. Again, these figures show no significant difference in the patterns of entrepreneur-
ial activity between treated and control states before enactment of the laws, reinforcing our con-
fidence in the difference-in-differences results.
The patterns of the dynamic treatment effect, as shown above, mitigate the legitimate concern
regarding the exogeneity of the shock. However, to additionally alleviate this concern, we conducted
a supplemental analysis to investigate whether states' economic and political conditions might influ-
ence the enactment of ENDA. Table A3 reports results of linear probability models where the
TABLE 1 Summary statistics
Average Average Average Average Average
All Treated Treated before Treated after Never treated
Entrepreneurial foundings 9,906.618 11,132.07 10,592.5 12,347.73 9,089.649
Startup quality (patents) .0069179 .4786922 .4757194 .48539 .4634275
Startup quality (VC) .0164056 .0087506 .0071599 .0123346 .005696
Startup quality (survival) .4695334 .0288156 .0133765 .0636001 .0081323
Antidiscrimination .122963 .3074074 0 1 0
GDP per capita 33,105.41 35,832.87 33,371.07 41,379.34 31,287.1
Net job creation rate 2.064519 2.026667 2.174332 1.693976 2.089753
Proportion black .0838422 .0580104 .0634592 .0457344 .1010634
Proportion women .5143248 .5137519 .5134066 .5145299 .5147067
Proportion college .1419066 .163042 .147968 .197004 .1278162
Red governor .477037 .4814815 .4090909 .6445783 .4740741
Taxation level 5.48947 5.666971 5.464953 6.122122 5.371136
Note: GDP per capita is in thousand 2012 US dollars. The number of firms is measured in thousands. Startup quality (VC) is in
million US dollars. Data on taxation not available for the District of Columbia.
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TABLE 2 Effect of employment antidiscrimination laws on the rate of entrepreneurial foundings and startup
quality: dynamics












t ≤ −5 0.019 −0.000 0.003 0.006
(0.032) (0.000) (0.011) (0.008)
t − 4 0.008 −0.000 −0.006 0.008
(0.026) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008)
t − 3 0.008 0.001 −0.006 0.007
(0.021) (0.000) (0.009) (0.007)
t − 2 0.009 0.001 −0.001 0.002
(0.018) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005)
t − 1 0.008 0.001 0.003 −0.001
(0.013) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004)
t + 1 −0.030 0.002 −0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
t + 2 −0.055 0.002 0.012 0.008
(0.019) (0.001) (0.014) (0.004)
t + 3 −0.051 0.002 0.009 0.011
(0.023) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
t + 5 −0.056 0.001 0.009 0.020
(0.029) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010)
t ≥ 5 −0.047 0.003 0.044 0.007
(0.024) (0.001) (0.025) (0.006)
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Job creation rate 0.006 −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Proportion black −0.627 0.008 0.046 0.245
(0.782) (0.012) (0.276) (0.122)
Proportion women 3.688 −0.020 1.200 0.108
(2.701) (0.025) (0.813) (0.401)
Proportion college −0.908 0.002 0.730 −0.321
(1.392) (0.014) (0.385) (0.205)
Red governor 0.003 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.015) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
Taxation level −0.050 −0.000 −0.004 0.004
(0.014) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
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dependent variable is the antidiscrimination law dummy, and the explanatory variables are the num-
ber of entrants in a given state-year, our proxies for startup quality, and GDP per capita. As can be
seen, the number of startups and their quality do not predict the enactment of antidiscrimination
laws, while firm survival is negatively associated with ENDA enactment. This suggests that the
TABLE 2 (Continued)












Observations 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350
State FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .867 .540 .724
Log-likelihood −53,658.517
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FIGURE 3 Dynamic effect of employment antidiscrimination laws on startup quality (innovation measure)
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positive treatment effect of antidiscrimination laws on the survival of new ventures represents a con-
servative estimate. But overall, this analysis reinforces our confidence regarding the exogeneity of the
changes in legal protection of LGBT groups with respect to entrepreneurial foundings.
We also note that our approach follows the classic approach as in Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2003) and, as such, due to the staggered nature of the treatment, the control
group includes all states (that is, not only states that are never treated, but also states that are
always or eventually treated in the time period considered). In this regard, one concern may be
that our estimates entail a comparison between late-treated states and early-treated states, which
might be problematic when the effect of treatment is “heterogeneous,” that is, it increases or
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Years since (until) reform
Coefficient estimates +/– one standard error
FIGURE 5 Dynamic effect of employment antidiscrimination laws on startup quality (survival measure)
6Goodman-Bacon (2020) shows that, when the treatment is staggered over time, the diff-in-diff estimator is a weighted
average of all possible diff-in-diff estimators that compare different group of units to each other, including: (a) treated
with never treated units as controls; (b) treated with always treated units as controls; (c) early treated with late treated
units (before treatment of the latter) as controls; (d) late treated versus early treated units (after treatment of the latter)
as controls. This latter comparison is problematic when the treatment effect is heterogenous (i.e., it changes over time),
as it might bias the estimates and due to “negative weights” in the computation of the average treatment effect.
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sample includes multiple states (i.e., 36) that are never treated in the considered time period.
Hence, the estimation of our treatment derives mostly from the comparison of treated versus
never-treated states. Moreover, as suggested by Goodman-Bacon (2020), we decompose the diff-in-
diff estimator, to assess the relative weight of each comparison. As expected, about 85% of variance
to estimate our treatment derives from the comparison between treated versus never- or always-
treated states. About 10% of the variance comes instead from the comparison between early treated
states versus. Later treated states (before they have been treated) as controls By contrast, only 5%
derives from the comparison between later treated versus earlier treated states (after they have
been treated) as controls, which is the comparison deemed problematic.
5.2 | Rate of entrepreneurial Foundings
Our results so far corroborate the validity of our identification approach and provide a set of
initial findings that are fully consistent with our theory. We next turn to evaluate in more
detail the effect of antidiscrimination laws on each dependent variable of interest, starting
from the number of new entrants. Because entrepreneurial foundings is a count variable, we
estimate a Poisson (fixed-effects) specification. However, as a robustness check, we also esti-
mate a log-linear OLS model. Table 3 reports the results of this basic estimation. The
Poisson specifications show that enactment of ENDA has a negative effect on entrepreneur-
ial foundings (Models 1–3 of Table 3). These results thus lend broad support to Hypothesis
(H1) and suggest that the institutional protection of minority employees decreases new-firm
entry by about 6% in specification 1, Table 3 (p-value equal to .047). The economic magni-
tude of the effect is similar if we restrict the time window around the treatment to 10 years
(as in specification 2) and 5 years (as in specification 3). This relatively large economic sig-
nificance likely reflects spillovers to other minority groups as well as to nonminorities.
Indeed, past studies find effects of comparable magnitude: For example, Gao and
Zhang (2017) document a 7.6% impact of pro-LGBT legislation on patenting rates and a
10.6% impact on patent citations. Similarly, Vakili and Zhang (2018) show that the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriages increases the number of patents by 6.2% and the number of pat-
enting organizations by 8.5%. Finally, Nguyen et al. (2020) demonstrate that LGBT
antidiscrimination laws increase a firm's market-to-book ratio by 3%. In all these studies,
spillovers to other social groups are also likely to explain the relatively large economic
effects. Such effects are found to be even larger when scholars consider pro-LGBT initiatives
at the firm-level. For example, a corporate equality index, which measures the level of sex-
ual orientation diversity, increases the stock market valuation by 16% (Wang &
Schwarz, 2010), and employee productivity (Shan, Fu, & Zheng, 2017) by 4%, while same-
sex domestic partnership benefits increase annualized excess returns by 14% and return on
assets by 20% (Li & Nagar, 2013). Further, there is direct evidence that pro-LGBT corporate
initiatives enhance the workplace attractiveness even among nonminority workers
(Badgett, Durso, & Schneebaum, 2013; Day & Schoenrade, 2000; Tejeda, 2006), further sub-
stantiating the indirect effect of pro-LGBT legislation due to the impact on non-LGBT
minorities as well as nonminority groups. Finally, as a robustness check, Models 4–6 of
Table 3 are estimated with an OLS specification where the dependent variable is the log of
the rate of entrepreneurial foundings. Even in this case, our results are largely recovered:
implementation of ENDA diminishes the rate of entrepreneurial foundings by 7%.
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5.3 | Startup quality
H2 posits that antidiscrimination laws will increase the quality of new entrants. To test this
hypothesis, we estimate fixed-effects linear models. Table 4 reports estimates for quality, as proxied
by startup patenting propensity in Models 1–3, VC funding per startup in Models 4–6, and the pro-
portion of firms surviving at least 5 years in Models 7–9. We estimate our models on the full time
period, but for robustness, we also limit the time window to either 10 or 5 years before and after
treatment. Finally, as previously mentioned, our models of the effect of ENDA on startup survival
include a state linear trend, to control for the different (negative) pretrend between treated and
control states. Consistent with our predictions, we find that, while the enactment of ENDA reduces
the overall new-firm entry, it also promotes entry of higher-quality startups. The parameter esti-
mate of the treatment dummy is positive across all specifications (p-value is equal to .002 in specifi-
cation 1 and 2 and to .01 in specification 3; to .007, .036, and .021, respectively, in specifications
4, 5, and 6; to .042, .173, and .063, respectively, in specifications 7, 8, and 9).
As for the economic significance of the effects, ENDA exerts a limited—but not
negligible—effect on the proportion of firms surviving at least 5 years, which increases by
about .01: this represents a 2% increase of the baseline proportion of surviving new ventures,
which is about .47. Furthermore, ENDA has a strong effect on startups' patenting propensity
and VC funding: the sample means of the two variables are 0.009 and 0.018, respectively.
The parameter estimates of Models 1 and 4 imply that enactment of ENDA increases pat-
enting propensity and VC funding by 0.002 and 0.025, respectively, that is, approximately
30 and 140% of the sample average. These results broadly support Hypothesis (H2), and sug-
gest that enactment of antidiscrimination laws increases the opportunity cost of entering
entrepreneurship by enhancing the attractiveness of paid employment. As a consequence,
when discrimination subsides, workers turn to entrepreneurship only to pursue attractive
opportunities that result in higher-quality ventures. In summary, we find strong support for
the key predictions of our study.
5.4 | Testing the mechanism
The previous analysis confirms the presence of a (macro-to-macro) link between institutional
protection from employment discrimination and entrepreneurship. That is, we show that the
former leads to lower rates of entrepreneurship but a higher quality of new ventures. We next
verify the mechanisms underlying these effects—or the macro-to-micro links depicted
Figure 1—by assessing how the relationship between antidiscrimination institutions and entre-
preneurship is affected by the contingencies we specified.
To begin with, as suggested by Hypothesis (H3a) and (H3b), the treatment effect should be
amplified in environments where the presence of the minority groups targeted by the ant-
idiscrimination legislation is more substantial. Indeed, in these environments, links 1 and 2 in
Figure 1 will be stronger because employers are more likely to implement antidiscrimination
initiatives to comply with the regulation, and, at the same time, the well-being of the protected
class is particularly responsive to firm pro-inclusion policies. To assess this claim, we first con-
sider whether the effect of ENDA tends to vary with the total LGBT population present in a
state, re-estimating our baseline models within two subsamples: above and below the median
levels of the U.S. LGBT population by state (we collected data on states' LGBT populations from
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the 2005 American Community Survey). Table 5 presents estimates for these models.7 Consis-
tent with our expectations, the effect of antidiscrimination initiatives—concerning both the
number of new foundings and their quality—is stronger in states where the gay population is
above the median. The economic difference across coefficients is evident. The p-values of the
test for the differential effect of antidiscrimination laws in high versus low gay population states
are presented in Table A4, Column 1: the p-value is equal to .011 for entrepreneurial foundings,
.002 for the patent-based measure of quality, .067 for the VC measure of quality, and .000 for
the survival-based measure of quality.
Based on Hypothesis (H4a) and (H4b), we would further expect that antidiscrimination laws will
prove particularly effective in areas where leveraging antidiscrimination laws is more common among
minority employees, since firms will comply to a larger degree with the institutional protection of
minority workers in order to avoid financial or reputational costs of litigation—which would
strengthen link 1 in Figure 1. To separate states with higher and lower propensity to leverage ant-
idiscrimination institutions, we collected litigation data on civil rights suits relating to jobs, available
from the Federal Judicial Centre Integrated databases, from 1970 to the present.8 For each state-year
in our data, we computed the count of civils suits. To avoid endogeneity with our antidiscrimination
legislation, we considered the number of grievances between 1970—the first year when the informa-
tion is available—and 1977—the year where ENDA has been enacted for the first time in DC. For
the purpose of our analyses, states that fall above the median in terms of the annual number of civil
right job suits are high-litigation states, and states that fall below the median in terms of the annual
number of civil right job suits are high-litigation states. As expected, Table 6 shows that the magni-
tude of the coefficient is persistently higher in high-litigation states. Tests for the statistical significance
of the difference between low- and high-litigation states are presented in Table A4, Column (2). The
p-value is equal to .073 for entrepreneurial foundings, .011 for the patent-based measure of quality,
.061 for the VC measure of quality, and .203 for startup life chances. Whereas the statistical accuracy
of differences varies across measures, and we cannot informedly speculate on the drivers of such dif-
ferences besides possible measurement noise, results point strongly in the direction of our theory.
5.5 | Supplemental mechanism tests
5.5.1 | LGBT occupations
To provide additional evidence for themechanismwe hypothesized, we assessed changes in the propor-
tion of self-employed individuals by occupation, following treatment. If our results reflect greater reten-
tion of LGBT workers within wage employment, then we should observe that the proportion of self-
employed individuals, in the post-ENDA period, declined most in occupations with a larger share of
LGBTworkers. Presumably, occupations with a higher concentration of gay individuals would bemost
affected by our treatment, thus providingmore direct evidence for themechanisms behind ENDA.
To test this prediction, we used the Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1995 to 2019. For
any state and year, we computed the proportion of self-employed individuals in the top 15 occupa-
tions/industries with the highest LGBT representation, as defined by Tilcsik, Anteby, and
7For split-sample analyses, we do not cluster the standard errors at the state level, as the number of clusters is too low
and could bias the estimates (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
8Data are available at: https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb.
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Knight (2015) and the proportion of self-employed individuals in other occupations.9 Finally, we esti-
mated the effect of our treatment on these proportions. Although given CPS' sampling procedure and
the reduced number of years, results should be treated with caution, as can be seen in Table A5, the
results are consistent with our prediction: Model (1) shows that, within the subsample of occupations
with high LGBT concentration, the share of self-employed workers—conditional on year and states
fixed effects—declined significantly after the treatment. The estimated effect is also economically siz-
able, as the proportion of self-employed in high LGBT occupation is equal to about 0.002. Model
(2) estimates the same baseline specifications, but within the subsample of occupations with a low
concentration of LGBT workers. In this case, the treatment dummy is positive, suggesting that the
observed effect is indeed stronger among jobs in which LGBT workers tend to be more highly repre-
sented. Because self-employed individuals are the ones most likely to be pushed out of wage employ-
ment due to discrimination, these estimates lend additional support to our claims.
5.5.2 | Minority founders
As a further test of the mechanisms, we directly assess the effect of antidiscrimination institutions
on the share of startups founded by minorities. Based on our theory, we expect that all
minorities—even the ones not specifically targeted by the new legislation—will be less exposed to
discrimination at work and thus less likely to transition to entrepreneurship, relative to nonminor-
ities. This will be reflected in a lower share of new ventures founded by minorities, in general. We
gather data on new ventures launched by minorities from the National Establishment Time-Series
(NETS) database, which provides information on new establishments founded by minorities
starting from 1989. Using these data, it is possible to identify new ventures founded by women as
well as by other minorities. Results in Table A6, estimated using OLS, confirm our expectations:
antidiscrimination legislation reduces the share of startups founded by minorities, and this result
holds when minority groups are combined (Model 1) or assessed separately (Models 2 and 3). Our
results (available upon request) are also robust to the use of a fractional logit model.
5.5.3 | Mediation effect
To the extent that antidiscrimination laws affect firm practices, we should further observe that
employers are more likely to implement firm-level policies to protect sexual minorities and pro-
mote diversity, following the enactment of such laws (cf., link 1 in Figure 1). In turn, these
firm-level policies should reduce the entrepreneurship rate but increase the new-venture
quality.
To verify if this is the case, we re-estimate our baseline specification, but now measure the
adoption of firm-level practices and assess whether a firm headquartered in a given state intro-
duced pro-diversity policies in a given year. Our main proxy for firm-level adoption of diversity pol-
icies is the LGBT antidiscrimination programs, or whether the focal firm has in place progressive
9Following Tilcsik et al. (2015), we code the following occupations as having high concentration of LGBT individuals:
Psychologists; Training and development specialists and managers; Social and community service managers; Technical
writers; Occupational therapists; Massage therapists; Urban and regional planners; Producers and directors;
Postsecondary teachers; Probation officers and correctional treatment specialists; Morticians, undertakers, and funeral
directors; Physical therapists and exercise physiologists; Computer and information systems managers; Lawyers, judges,
magistrates, and other judicial workers; Web developers.
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LGBT policies, that is, polices aimed at the minority targeted by the antidiscrimination laws. Using
the KLD data, we construct a dummy variable coded as “1” if, in a reference year, a firm had
enacted LGBT antidiscrimination programs, and “0” otherwise. As another dependent variable, we
model Diversity-promoting programs and measure the presence of corporate initiatives to promote
other minorities, including women and racial minorities. Finally, we consider CSR programs, or
the aggregated KLD score a firm receives for policies favoring different stakeholder groups (i.e., the
community, employees, diversity, the natural environment, and customers).
We estimate OLS models controlling for firm size (measured as thousands of employees,
source: COMPUSTAT), leverage (long-term debt over total financing, source: COMPUSTAT),
cash holdings (source: COMPUSTAT), capital expenditure (source: COMPUSTAT), firm fixed
effects, and year fixed effects. Consistent with our expectations, Table A7 shows that firms
operating in states that enacted ENDA are more likely to introduce pro-gay/lesbian policies
(Model 1), as well as diversity-promoting programs (Model 2). Strikingly, we also find an
increase in firms' overall CSR scores, as indicated by the KLD index, following the enactment of
ENDA (Model 3). In summary, these supplemental analyses lend support to our main mecha-
nism, whereby state-level policies that prohibit discrimination lead to firm-level adoption of ini-
tiatives and programs to prevent discrimination in the labor market and to cater to a broad
range of stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, and communities).
The previous analysis confirms that the enactment of the antidiscrimination laws has
induced companies to implement antidiscrimination corporate programs. However, to further
establish that the effect of antidiscrimination institutions on entrepreneurship is mediated by
antidiscrimination corporate programs, it is further necessary to establish that the latter pro-
grams have, in turn, reduced the rate of entrepreneurial foundings while increasing their qual-
ity and survival. This seems to be the case, based on the results presented in Table A8. Models
(1)–(4)—estimated by a simple linear regression—show a positive coefficient on Gay-Lesbian
Antidiscrimination Policies except for firm survival in Model 4. Because these results are sug-
gestive but not definitive evidence for mediation, we additionally follow the approach by
Shaver (2005) and estimate an instrumental variable regression, where we use ENDA as an
instrument for corporate antidiscrimination, which is equivalent to assuming full mediation.10
As can be seen in Models (5)–(8), when we instrument Gay-Lesbian Antidiscrimination Policies
with the enactment of ENDA, we find similar effects: antidiscrimination policies are negatively
associated with entrepreneurial and positively associated with the new-venture quality.11
5.5.4 | Individual-level experimental analysis
So far, our analyses have been conducted at the state level. However, our theory implies
changes in individual-level job satisfaction, following the enactment of antidiscrimination poli-
cies. In turn, this increased job satisfaction will result in a lower individual likelihood of
10One limitation of these estimates, however, is the inability to test for whether the mediating effect is partial or full.
One empirical approach would involve including in the same equation the mediated variable and the mediator.
Although recent research (e.g., Shaver, 2005) has clearly shown this approach may bias estimates, for the sake of
completeness, we have also taken this approach and our estimates—which, given all the endogeneity problem should
be taken with the grain of salt—suggest the presence of partial mediation. Given endogeneity problems potentially
affecting our estimates, we have decided not to include these last results in the current manuscript.
11As KLD data on corporate antidiscrimination programs are only available since 1991, we substitute missing values in
previous years with zero. Using a linear extrapolation method to impute missing values gives us similar results.
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transitioning to entrepreneurship. To validate the theorized micro-level links depicted in
Figure 1, which cannot be tested for directly in observational data, we next turn to an experi-
mental vignette study. Specifically, we examine whether the enactment of antidiscrimination
policies in wage work enhances its attractiveness, inclining our subjects to forgo entrepreneur-
ship. Using a sample of 424 online workers currently employed in the U.S. and holding at least
a bachelor degree, we attempted to validate this argument in an online experiment. To obtain
variation in antidiscrimination laws, we used three different scenarios, two of which are control
groups and one is a treatment group.12 The first control group received a generic description
with no reference to any laws (“baseline”). The treatment group received the same description
as in the baseline, but with supplemental information describing the enactment of the employ-
ment antidiscrimination laws. To account for the treatment group receiving more information
than the control group, we used a second control group in which we supplemented the baseline
scenario with additional generic information about the enactment of state laws unrelated to the
decision to leave paid employment or to become an entrepreneur. After receiving all the infor-
mation, subjects were then asked about: (a) their willingness to leave current employment to
become an entrepreneur and (b) how satisfied they will be working for their current employer.
Table A9 shows the phrasing of the four messages, as well as the complete script of the experi-
ment.13 Table A10 reports the means across the three conditions to validate random assignment
and establish that the key respondent characteristics were balanced across groups.
The results are presented in Table A11. As can be seen, participants in the treatment group
(Model 3) were less willing to found their own business (mean = 2.18) than participants in the
baseline control group (mean = 2.62; Model 1) or length-matched control group (mean = 2.57;
Model 2). Further, participants in the treatment group (Model 3) report greater perceived attrac-
tiveness of wage employment (mean = 3.88) than participants in the baseline control group
(mean = 3.38; Model 1) or length-matched control group (mean = 3.49; Model 2).14 Together,
these results provide supportive evidence that initiatives designed to prohibit employment dis-
crimination enhance workplace appeal and thus reduce the attractiveness of leaving for entre-
preneurship (link 2 in Figure 1).
Overall, our extensive set of empirical results provide broad support for our model reported
in Figure 1 and its causal pathways, linking minority protection and entrepreneurship. First,
we found strong support for (H1) and (H2), the macro-to-macro link—and we have shown
(H3 and H4) that this effect is stronger where it is expected to be so if the mechanism is the
envisioned one. We also have shown that the enactment of ENDA has led to higher organizational
compliance (link 1, Figure 1), and that organizational compliance leads to lower levels of
12We only included in our sample participants who passed the attention check. Participants who failed or did not
complete the survey were removed from the sample.
13An important concern in survey design is the possibility of social desirability bias, or the tendency of participants to
present themselves in a socially acceptable way. In our case, social desirability bias may motivate the respondents to
express favorable opinions about diversity initiatives. We mitigated this concern in two ways. First, we administered the
survey in an anonymous manner and informed the respondents that their identity would remain undisclosed. Second,
the respondents were told that they would receive compensation regardless of their views. Finally, we implemented the
technique of “indirect questioning,” which has been shown to reduce social desirability bias. Specifically, we presented
the respondents with a hypothetical scenario and asked them to make decisions regarding entrepreneurship.
14We additionally find that the treatment condition is associated with lower willingness to found a business for both
historically discriminated participants as well as for non-minorities. This lends additional support to the spillover effects
to non-minorities, as hypothesized.
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entrepreneurship—in particular for minorities (link 2, Figure 1). While this evidence is strongly
supporting our theory, we also consider alternative explanations— and rule them out empirically.
5.6 | Alternative explanations
5.6.1 | Entrepreneurship Costs
An important alternative explanation could be that antidiscrimination laws increase the costs
of founding a new venture, due to additional training requirements or potential lawsuits. Alleg-
edly, this would be the case if antidiscrimination laws “raise the cost of doing business, which
makes everyone suffer, because businesses pass those costs on to consumers in the form of
higher prices.”15Although plausible, this concern is unlikely for several reasons. First, nonparti-
san sources such as the Congressional Budget Office of 2013 estimated the ENDA costs to the
private sector to be relatively small, and mostly administrative.16 Second, our effect is amplified
in states with greater representation of LGBT individuals, states with greater levels of discrimi-
nation, and occupations with a higher concentration of LGBT workers. These findings would
be difficult to explain with increases in costs alone. Nonetheless, we conduct supplemental ana-
lyses to inspect this alternative explanation even further.
First, we examine whether our treatment is weaker in states (California, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington) that allows smaller firms to be exempted from compliance.17 If
our effect is driven by an increase in costs for entrepreneurs, we would expect that the negative
effect we observe is mitigated in those states—presumably because entrepreneurs would be less
concerned about the costs when truly small firms (often startups) are exempted from complying to
the legislation. To assess this cross-sectional heterogeneity, we re-estimate the baseline specifica-
tion but model the effect of ENDA when they apply to all firms versus when they apply to only
larger firms separately. As Table A12 shows, the coefficients of the antidiscrimination law are simi-
lar (in terms of the magnitude or statistical significance) regardless of whether the law applies to
any firm or alternatively only to firms larger than a certain size threshold. If anything, the effect of
the antidiscrimination laws is stronger in states that exempt small firms from compliance. This
finding provides some reassurance that costs, which could potentially be imposed on entrepre-
neurs following the passage of ENDA, are an unlikely driver of our effects.
Second, we investigate the effect of our treatment on exit rate. If employees are less likely to
become entrepreneurs because the expected costs of launching a new venture increase, we
should observe not only a decrease in new-firm entry, but also an increase in firm exit, based
on the presumption that the increased costs of litigation will force small existing businesses out.
We thus collected data on firm exit from the LBD dataset and verified the effect of ENDA on exit.
Table A13 shows that antidiscrimination laws have no effect on exit. This result is not consistent
with the idea that antidiscrimination legislation leads to increased business costs of new ventures.
15See: http://executivelp.com/laws-regulations/21st-century-effects-of-discrimination-do-we-still-need-anti-
discrimination-laws/. Accessed August 2017.
16The Congressional Budget Office of 2013 estimated that changes to comply with ENDA would be “relatively minor
and would be made in the course of other routine updates” (Congressional Budget Office. S. 815, Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2013. September 11, 2013. http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/s815.pdf).
17The minimum firm size threshold below which the law does not apply might vary from 3 employees (as in
Connecticut) to 15 employees (as in Illinois or Nevada).
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5.6.2 | Economic expansion or downturn
The passage of pro-LGBT legislation might trigger changes in the economy, leading to either
expansion or downturn. Such changes, might, in turn, lead to lower rates of entrepreneurship
and higher rates of high-quality ventures. As mentioned before, however, prior research finds
positive effects of pro-LGBT legislation on firm productivity and innovation (e.g., Nguyen
et al., 2020; Vakili & Zhang, 2018), thus mitigating a concern that economic downturn might
drive our results. Our findings are similarly unlikely to be driven by economic expansion
because the estimates are robust to including state-level GDP per capita in our models. How-
ever, to additionally, mitigate this concern, we re-estimate the baseline specifications from
Table A14, but now include a control for GDP growth rate (in addition to GDP per capita),
which can capture economic growth more precisely, and our results are fully recovered.
5.6.3 | Simultaneous shocks
One might be concerned that events contemporaneous with the enactment of antidiscrimination
laws are responsible for the change in patterns of entrepreneurial entry. However, evidence for the
mechanisms, as discussed in the previous section, mitigates this concern: if our estimates reflect
other legal changes around this time, then we would not observe a number of outcomes, as our the-
ory predicted. Furthermore, the staggered enactment of the laws makes the occurrence of exactly
simultaneous unobserved events less likely. Still, to increase confidence in our findings, we collected
data on other legal reforms implemented in the United States within the timeframe of our empirical
analysis. We focus on key legal changes either shown to have an effect on entrepreneurship or
expected to influence entrepreneurial rates and quality in theory. These include changes in trade-
secrets protection via the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA; Castellaneta, Conti, &
Kacperczyk, 2017; Png, 2012), bank deregulation laws (Kerr & Nanda, 2009), and variation in judi-
cial selection methods, which affect the independence of the judiciary from incumbent businesses
(Conti & Valentini, 2018). Some of these reforms occurred in our treated states or in neighboring
states. Hence, one might be concerned that these reforms affected entrepreneurship, leading to spu-
rious correlations in our estimates. To mitigate this challenge, we re-estimate the baseline specifica-
tions with additional controls for years in which these changes occurred. As shown in Table A15,
adding these additional covariates to our basic specification does not change the significance of our
main estimates, with respect to either the number or quality of new ventures.
6 | DISCUSSION
Although ample research investigates the individual and organizational antecedents of an individ-
ual's entry into entrepreneurship (e.g., Kacperczyk, 2012), factors responsible for this transition are
not fully understood—given that returns to entrepreneurship tend to be lower than earnings in
wage work (e.g., Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz & Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). The lion's share of
research has documented the critical importance of the institutional environment in driving entre-
preneurship, but the extant studies have predominantly focused on institutional changes that tar-
get prospective founders, by facilitating access to resources. Drawing on research that considers
entrepreneurship to be a mobility decision (e.g., Hellmann, 2007; Kacperczyk, 2012; Sørensen &
Sharkey, 2014), we argue and find support for the claim that institutional changes that target
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current employees, by enhancing their work conditions and reducing employer discrimination play
a critical role in influencing entrepreneurship, for two reasons. First, as discrimination subsides,
wage work becomes more appealing, depressing founding rates. Second, because the threshold for
giving up wage work rises, such declines result in the higher growth potential of new ventures
launched. Overall, workers respond to declines in employer bias by being less willing and less
motivated to found new ventures, but those who nevertheless transition to entrepreneurship do so
primarily to explore high-growth opportunities.
Whereas past research on the impact of institutional protections of minority workers on entre-
preneurial firms remains scant, we theorize and find empirical support for the claim that institu-
tions that prohibit employment discrimination are likely to trigger two opposite effects on
entrepreneurship. First, such regulations are expected to suppress entry into entrepreneurship, by
making the workplace more attractive to the protected class, other minorities, and some
nonminority workers alike. Lending support to this expectation, we find that the enactment of
ENDA, which banned employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity, had a negative effect on entrepreneurial foundings, leading to lower rates of new-venture
creation. Second, although the rate of new-venture creation will fall, the quality of new ventures is
expected to rise, given that institutional protection from discrimination will increase the threshold
for giving up paid employment. Together, therefore, these main findings lend support to our theo-
retical framework, documenting the profound and so-far neglected impact of institutional protec-
tion from employment discrimination on the founding rates and quality of new ventures.
Our analyses probed deeper into the mechanisms we theorized. First, consistent with the
notion that entry into entrepreneurship fluctuates vis-à-vis the attractiveness of paid employ-
ment, we find that our effects are amplified in states with higher representation of the protected
minority workers. In addition, we find that the negative effect of the institutional protection of
minority employees on entrepreneurship, including the rate of entry and quality, is amplified in
states where litigation against employers regarding workplace discrimination is more common
or more prevalent. In tandem, these cross-sectional, heterogenous effects lend additional evi-
dence to the mechanisms we theorize: that the relative appeal of paid employment increases, as
institutional protection of disadvantaged groups intensifies.
Our work is also defined by some limitations. First, as in most quasi-experimental studies using
institutional variation for identification and despite a battery of robustness tests, we cannot indis-
putably claim that the regulatory change represents a fully exogenous source of variation; hence,
our results should be interpreted with caution even if they remain consistent with the vignette
experiment in which we leverage random assignment. Second, we conceptualized the mechanisms
underlying our macro-to-macro link (see Figure 1) and offered additional tests to probe these pro-
cesses deeper. But further opportunities exist to test these micro-level processes with greater preci-
sion. For example, future studies could focus on more fine-grained, employer-employee data to
model individual transitions from paid employment into entrepreneurship as well as additional
experimentally-collected data. With such data at hand, researchers may want to further investigate
whether the effects we document vary systematically across employees occupying different posi-
tions or organizational ranks within organizations.
Despite these limitations, our results carry relevant implications for theory and practice. First,
our study contributes to the vibrant body of work on the determinants of entrepreneurial entry
(e.g., Kacperczyk, 2012; Moskowitz & Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Stenard & Sauermann, 2016).
Whereas ample research has documented the influence of the institutional environment in driving
entrepreneurial rates (e.g., Eberhart et al., 2017; Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine, Haveman, and
Tolbert, 2005); past work has primarily considered the impact of regulations targeting prospective
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founders. By contrast, we shift the focus of these debates to consider regulations targeting current
employees, given that entrepreneurship can be conceptualized as a mobility process
(e.g., Kacperczyk & Marx, 2016; Sørensen & Sharkey, 2014). We thus bring these recent conversa-
tions with research on institutional protection from employer discrimination (e.g., Kelly &
Dobbin, 1999) to develop and evaluate a new explanation for entrepreneurial entry: institutional
protection from employer discrimination. Our study thus extends the line of work on entrepre-
neurship determinants (e.g., Campbell et al., 2012; Carnahan et al., 2012; Kacperczyk, 2012), while
also contributing to the growing scholarly interest in institutional constraints imposed on individ-
uals' careers and their role in shaping the decision to become a founder (Hwang & Phillips, 2020;
Agarwal et al., 2021). By documenting that entrepreneurial entry rates and new-venture quality
are influenced by labor market institutions, we thus establish the unintended effects of such insti-
tutions on startup creation and quality.
In addition, we extend the scope of the strategy and organizational research on the effects of
institutional protection from employer discrimination on firm performance and competitive
advantage (e.g., Negro & Olzak, 2019; Nguyen et al., 2020; Gao & Zhang, 2017; Vakili &
Zhang, 2018; Shan et al., 2017; Wang & Schwarz, 2010). Whereas past research has documented
the beneficial impact of such initiatives on established, mature firms, we show that institutional
protection against discrimination affects entrepreneurial ventures alike, by impacting wage
workers and their perception of paid work. In short, our study offers evidence that protecting
minorities from employer discrimination can have unintended consequences on the creation
and the quality of new ventures.
From a policy perspective, our findings illuminate the critical importance of institutional
protection from employment discrimination for economy-wide outcomes, beyond mature,
established firms alone. This further suggests possible labor market interventions that can have
major policy implications. For example, interventions aimed at increasing the quality of entre-
preneurship might focus on reducing discrimination in paid work, but these measures should
also target regions and states with a higher representation of the discriminated groups and
greater prevalence of litigation against employment discrimination ex-ante. Our findings sug-
gest that it is in those cases that the effects of institutional protection from employment discrim-
ination on entrepreneurship are most pronounced because discriminated groups will be most
likely to leverage institutional mechanisms to fend off discriminatory acts.
In summary, our study makes important contributions to theories and empirical work on
institutional protection against discrimination in wage employment and research on entrepre-
neurship. Importantly, whereas the predominant focus in past research has been on the institu-
tional factors that target prospective founders, we advance current theories by developing a
framework to understand the impact of institutional factors that target employees on entrepre-
neurship, its creation, and quality. Our study shifts away from the traditional approach by
suggesting work on the importance of the institutional environment needs to move beyond con-
sidering initiatives designed to increase entrepreneurial rates. Incorporating initiatives
implemented with employees and their welfare in mind into the current theories and frame-
works is the next step toward a clearer understanding of the impact of institutions on the crea-
tion of new firms.
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